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Onur Kesten
Onur Kesten
Verified email at andrew.cmu.edu
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
School choice with consent
O Kesten
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (3), 1297-1348, 2010
385*2010
Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: A theoretical analysis
Y Chen, O Kesten
Journal of Political Economy 125 (1), 99-139, 2017
2292017
On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
O Kesten
Journal of Economic Theory 127 (1), 155-171, 2006
2262006
A theory of school‐choice lotteries
O Kesten, MU Ünver
Theoretical Economics 10 (2), 543-595, 2015
1282015
Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
T Hashimoto, D Hirata, O Kesten, M Kurino, MU Ünver
Theoretical Economics 9 (1), 253-277, 2014
116*2014
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
O Kesten
Economic Theory 51, 677-693, 2012
922012
Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study
Y Chen, O Kesten
Games and Economic Behavior 115, 83-100, 2019
792019
Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
O Kesten
Journal of Economic Theory 144 (5), 2209-2226, 2009
732009
Matching Markets With Mixed Ownership: The Case For A Real‐Life Assignment Mechanism
P Guillen, O Kesten
International Economic Review 53 (3), 1027-1046, 2012
54*2012
From Boston to Chinese parallel to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms
Y Chen, K Onur
WZB Discussion Paper, 2013
512013
The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
R Hakimov, O Kesten
International Economic Review 59 (4), 2219-2258, 2018
492018
Matching in the large: An experimental study
Y Chen, M Jiang, O Kesten, S Robin, M Zhu
Games and Economic Behavior 110, 295-317, 2018
452018
Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
O Kesten
International Journal of Game Theory 38, 17-21, 2009
422009
Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
U Dur, O Kesten
Economic Theory 68, 251-283, 2019
322019
From Boston to Shanghai to deferred acceptance: Theory and experiments on a family of school choice mechanisms
Y Chen, O Kesten
International Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their …, 2011
312011
An empirical evaluation of Chinese college admissions reforms through a natural experiment
Y Chen, M Jiang, O Kesten
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117 (50), 31696-31705, 2020
302020
Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility
O Kesten, M Kurino
Games and Economic Behavior 117, 120-143, 2019
282019
The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
O Kesten, A Yazıcı
Economic Theory 50, 463-488, 2012
252012
An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
Ö Ekici, O Kesten
International Journal of Game Theory 45, 655-674, 2016
24*2016
The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange improves its matching process
VW Slaugh, M Akan, O Kesten, MU Ünver
Interfaces 46 (2), 133-153, 2016
232016
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