| Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning K Iyer, R Johari, M Sundararajan Management Science 60 (12), 2949-2970, 2014 | 182 | 2014 |
| Optimal signaling mechanisms in unobservable queues D Lingenbrink, K Iyer Operations Research, 2019 | 81 | 2019 |
| Mean field equilibria for resource competition in spatial settings P Yang, K Iyer, P Frazier Stochastic Systems 8 (4), 307-334, 2018 | 42* | 2018 |
| Information aggregation and allocative efficiency in smooth markets K Iyer, R Johari, CC Moallemi Management Science 60 (10), 2509-2524, 2014 | 42* | 2014 |
| From monetary to nonmonetary mechanism design via artificial currencies A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer Mathematics of Operations Research 46 (3), 835-1234, C2, 2021 | 35 | 2021 |
| Information design for congested social services: Optimal need-based persuasion J Anunrojwong, K Iyer, V Manshadi Management Science, 2022 | 26 | 2022 |
| Signaling in online retail: Efficacy of public signals D Lingenbrink, K Iyer Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and …, 2018 | 22 | 2018 |
| Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance Y Zu, K Iyer, H Xu ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'21), 2021 | 15 | 2021 |
| When fixed price meets priority auctions: Competing firms with different pricing and service rules J Gao, K Iyer, H Topaloglu Stochastic Systems 9 (1), 47–80, 2019 | 10 | 2019 |
| Near-efficient allocation using artificial currency in repeated settings A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2016), 2016 | 10 | 2016 |
| Persuading risk-conscious agents: A geometric approach J Anunrojwong, K Iyer, D Lingenbrink arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.03758, 2022 | 9 | 2022 |
| Welfare analysis of dark pools K Iyer, R Johari, C Moallemi | 8 | 2016 |
| Sensitivity analysis and optimal ultimately stationary deterministic policies in some constrained discounted cost models K Iyer, N Hemachandra Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 71, 401-425, 2010 | 6 | 2010 |
| Tractable equilibria in sponsored search with endogenous budgets DF Ciocan, K Iyer Operations research 69 (1), 227-244, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
| Information design in spatial resource competition P Yang, K Iyer, P Frazier Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2019), 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| Price competition under linear demand and finite inventories: Contraction and approximate equilibria J Gao, K Iyer, H Topaloglu Operations Research Letters 45 (4), 382-387, 2017 | 5 | 2017 |
| The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'21), 2021 | 4 | 2021 |
| When bribes are harmless: The power and limits of collusion-resilient mechanism design A Gorokh, S Banerjee, K Iyer Available at SSRN 3125003, 2019 | 3 | 2019 |
| Information and the value of execution guarantees K Iyer, R Johari, CC Moallemi Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 673-673, 2012 | 2 | 2012 |
| Ultimately stationary deterministic strategies for stochastic games KR Iyer, N Hemachandra Proceedings of the international conference on advances in control and …, 2007 | 1 | 2007 |
Ramesh JohariProfessor, Management Science and Engineering, Stanford UniversityVerified email at stanford.edu
